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Introduction  
An apparent contradiction between rhetorical claims of piracy threats to international shipping and 
actual attack trends has established the need for a more structured approach to strategic risk 
assessment. This article provides new insight into risk assessment methodologies by integrating 
a structured, multi-dimensional approach to attack profiling within a more comprehensive 
Proximity–Complexity model. This model was empirically examined by conducting a comparative 
risk assessment in two regions widely cited as high risk, the Straits of Malacca in Asia and the 
coastal waters of Nigeria. Results indicate that the consideration of geographic proximity of 
attacks as a risk factor may need to be more carefully examined. Further, the authors suggest 
that counter-piracy strategies could benefit from a multi-stage risk assessment methodology that 
integrates both structured and geographic approaches within a more comprehensive analytic 
framework.  
Sea-based trade may account for as much as 77 percent of worldwide trade measured in terms 
of volume, overwhelming overland (16 percent), international pipeline (6.7 percent), and 
international air freight trade (0.3 percent) as the dominant transportation mechanism.[1] 
Worldwide dependency has, in turn, led to increased concerns over the safety of international sea 
lanes. Reflecting the concerns of a post-9/11 world, the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime 
Security warns of the danger of a convergence of international armed piracy and terrorism.[2]  
However, despite continued concerns over maritime and shipping threats, attack frequency has 
lessened in some high risk regions. The International Maritime Bureau reports that the numbers 
of attacks have increased in Nigeria and Somalia but that attacks have declined in Indonesia, the 
Straits of Malacca, and Bangladesh.[3] An apparent contradiction between rhetorical claims of 
threats and actual attack trends establishes the need for a more structured approach to the risk 
analysis of threats to international shipping. The aim of this study is to provide new insight into 
risk methodologies by integrating a structured threat assessment approach with geographic 
information analysis and visualization techniques. Sound threat and risk assessment 
methodologies are an essential prerequisite to the development of any effective counter-piracy 
strategy.  
The threat assessment framework developed for this study was explored by conducting a 
comparative analysis in two regions widely cited as high risk, the Straits of Malacca in Asia and 
the coastal waters of Nigeria in western Africa. As much as one-third of the world’s trade and 
one-half of its oil may transit through the Straits of Malacca.[4] In Nigeria disruptions of oil 
production can threaten a strained world oil market that is critically dependent on its 
contribution.[5] Additionally, variations in attack profiles within two differing regions may provide a 
realistic validation of this study’s exploratory framework.  
It is hypothesized that strategic maritime risk increases when attacks against international 
shipping occur in close proximity to strategically important locations, as attacks increase in 
complexity and lethality, and when attacks target shipping carrying inherently dangerous cargo 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for maritime risk. 
 
Proximity refers to the distance between the attack and a strategic location within the region and 
was computed as line of sight distances. For the Straits of Malacca the strategic locus was 
defined as its narrowest point, the easternmost chokepoint (latitude/longitude, 02 16 17.19N/101 
47 41.41E). For the coastal area of Nigeria the strategic locus was defined as the Shell Bonny 
Export Terminal (latitude/longitude, 04 12 40.00N/007 16 00.00E), a critical oil export facility. 
Distances were scaled from a value of 5 to 0 in increments of 50 nautical miles (nm) from each 
strategic locus. Attacks in the range of 0-50 nm were assigned a value of 5; 51-100 nm a value of 
4; 101-150 nm a value of 3; 151-200 nm a value of 2; 201-250 nm a value of 1; and, attacks 
further than 250 nm a value of 0.  
A complexity index was calculated by assigning values to variables for the number of perpetrators 
and the type of weapons used in an attack. Perpetrator values were: 0—number of person 
involved unknown; 1—1 to 4 persons; 2—5 to 10 persons; 3—more than 10 persons. Weapons 
values were: 0—weapon not known; 1—other; 2—armed with knives; 3—armed with guns. A 
complexity index was aggregated by summing the values for both number of perpetrators and for 
weapons use.  
Lethality was calculated by assessing the type of violence enacted against both ship and ship 
crews. Lethality values were: 0—unknown; 1—ship hijacked; 2—ship missing; 3—threat of 
violence against crew; 4—actual violence against crew.  
Target selection refers to the type of vessel selected for attack. Of the twenty-two types of 
vessels tracked by the International Maritime Bureau, five categories were selected as most 
dangerous based on inherent lethality. Target selection values were: 0—other; 1—cargo ship; 2—
tanker; 3—chemical tanker; 4—LPG/LNG (liquid petroleum gas/liquid natural gas) tanker.  
A composite risk index was compiled by summing all variable values. If all variables reflected 
their highest value, the score for the risk index would have a value of 19. 
Method 
This study utilized the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau’s 
(IMB) annual Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships report as a data source. The combined 
number of attacks reported for 2006 and 2007 were N = 17 and N = 56 for the Straits of Malacca 
and Nigeria respectively. Using the descriptive narrative provided for attacks in the IMB’s annual 
reports covering reporting for 2006[6] and 2007[7], the authors were able to review each attack 
individually and to assess selected risk variables. Correlations between risk variables were 
computed using SPSS.[8] A RCGIS was utilized to compute geographic locations of strategically 
important locations, individually assess the geographic proximity of each attack, identify overall 
geographic patterns of attacks and to visualize results.[9] 
Results  
Correlational analysis was conducted to explore the relationship between all research variables 
for the Straits of Malacca and for Nigeria. For reported attacks in the Straits of Malacca, no 
statistically significant correlations were found between attack proximity (e.g., closeness to the 
easternmost chokepoint) and any other variable. A statistically significant positive correlation was 
found between complexity and lethality and between complexity and this study’s risk index. In 
addition, a statistically significant positive correlation was found between attack lethality and the 
composite risk index (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix for the Straits of Malacca  
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Nigeria 
 
For reported attacks in Nigeria, statistically significant positive correlations were found between 
attack proximity (e.g., closeness to the Shell Bonny Export Terminal), complexity, and this study’s 
risk index. A statistically significant negative correlation was found between attack proximity and 
target selection. A statistically significant positive correlation was found between complexity and 
lethality and the risk index. A statistically significant positive correlation was found between 
lethality and the risk index (see Table 2).  
Geospatial analysis was conducted to explore the proximity of attacks as a dimension of strategic 
risk. Reported attacks were plotted according to location of occurrence and rated according to 
selected risk criteria. Geospatial analysis for the Straits of Malacca revealed that attacks occurred 
primarily in the vicinity of its eastern and western chokepoints (see Appendix). Results for Nigeria 
indicated that attacks occurred primarily in the vicinity of two locations with most attacks 
clustering near the Shell Bonny Export Terminal and the Lagos port facility (see Appendix). 
Discussion 
The purpose of this exploratory study was to provide new insight into threat assessment 
methodologies by developing and empirically examining a structured, multi-dimensional approach 
to profiling attacks on maritime shipping. The overall goal was to assess the ability of a Proximity–
Complexity model and integrated geographic information to provide new perspectives on strategic 
maritime risk assessment.  
As a comparative study, this study confirmed the existence of differing regional dimensions to 
maritime risk. The average composite risk index for Nigeria (8.46) was substantially greater than 
that for the Straits of Malacca (5.76). These results indicate that, overall, shipping is at greater 
risk in the coastal Nigeria region.  
Specifically, results indicate that reported attacks in Nigeria are both more complex and more 
lethal than reported attacks in the Straits of Malacca. Average scores for attack complexity were 
2.18 and 2.82 for the Straits of Malacca and Nigeria respectively. Average scores for attack 
lethality were .94 and 2.41 for the Straits of Malacca and Nigeria respectively. The greatest risk 
index for any single attack was for an attack in Nigeria in which well-equipped gunmen in multiple 
speedboats attacked a fuel-carrying barge, killing 3 soldiers providing security and kidnapping 25 
Nigerian workers.[10] In no case was loss of life reported in an attack in the Straits of Malacca. It 
is likely that shipping in the Straits of Malacca enjoys the benefits from recently enacted anti-
piracy measures.[11]  
In general, this study’s hypothesized Proximity–Complexity model fared well. Correlational 
analysis was able to find statistically significant relationships between the proposed composite 
risk index and three of the four supporting dimensions (proximity, complexity, and lethality). Only 
for the dimension of target selection was no statistically significant correlation found. These 
results provide tentative support for this study’s Proximity–Complexity model.  
This study’s correlational analysis of risk factors may also provide new, useful insights to counter-
piracy strategists. The risk factors for the Straits of Malacca when rank ordered according to the 
strength of their relationship to risk are: complexity (r = .75**), lethality (r = .74**), proximity (r 
= .46), and target selection (r = -.33). The results for Nigeria are similar, although stronger. The 
risk factors for Nigeria when rank ordered according to the strength of their relationship to risk are: 
lethality (r = .72**), complexity (r = .69**), proximity (r = .67**), and target selection (r = -.07).  
These results may assist strategists and policy makers by providing an initial schema for the 
development and prioritization of piracy countermeasures. The results indicate that complexity 
and lethality play a dominant role in composite risk. The results also indicate that target selection 
plays a weaker role in composite risk than might have been assessed intuitively. Accordingly, 
these results may encourage the development of countermeasures that are designed to address 
target complexity and lethality and emphasize the overall threat environment versus a focusing 
solely on ships with dangerous cargo. For example, measures might be enacted to derive pirates 
of the sanctuary necessary to launch complex, massed attacks. Alternatively, measures might be 
taken to reduce the availability of weapons in the region. Finally, measures might be enacted that 
address piracy as a generalized threat to shipping.  
A key finding of this research was the importance of properly sequencing analytic approaches. 
Since this study’s conceptual framework for maritime risk began with an a priori decision 
regarding strategic geography (the easternmost chokepoint in the Straits of Malacca and the 
Shell Bonny Terminal in Nigeria) it was capable of assessing risk relative to a selected strategic 
locus but it was unable to uncover new risk areas. This problem was resolved through the 
integrated use of geographic information analysis techniques. Use of an a priori decision based 
on the general rhetorical discussion on chokepoint vulnerabilities concealed the presence of 
multi-loci threats within general geographic areas until it was revealed by geospatial analysis. 
This methodological finding generally supports the use of geospatial analysis before factor-based 
analysis.  
Currently actual and attempted armed attacks at sea are mapped and visually displayed by the 
IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre.[12] However, by integrating additional attack dimensions 
(proximity, complexity, etc.) in conjunction with geographic information, this study was able to 
interpret and visualize reported attacks in more informative ways. Like the IMB’s effort, this study 
was able to display historical geographic patterns of attacks. However, new insights were gained 
by re-examining attack patterns according to complexity and geographic location simultaneously. 
In this way, areas of greatest risk, such as those possessing a geographic cluster of complex or 
lethal attacks, were able to be discovered and visualized (see Appendix).  
Based on the a priori selection of the Straits of Malacca’s easternmost chokepoint as a single 
strategic epicenter, no statistically significant correlations were found between attack proximity 
and any other risk variable. However, the integrated use of geographic information did confirm 
separate clusters of threats to shipping in both the easternmost and westernmost sections of the 
Straits of Malacca. With regards to Nigeria, the integrated use of geographic information was able 
to confirm, as expected, threats to shipping in the vicinity of the Shell Bonny oil export terminal. It 
was also able to identify a second geographic cluster of complex attacks in the vicinity of the port 
of Lagos, Nigeria (see Appendix).  
Some analysts have previously challenged the strategic vulnerability of sea-based trade, 
including oil flows. Blair and Lieberthal posit that maritime trade is buttressed by at least four 
resiliency factors including: the inherent size and strength of global tanker fleets, the inability of 
limited regional conflict and terrorist action to impact trade economics, the position of the U.S. as 
the only world power capable of disrupting trade and the inevitable formation of global coalitions 
to protect sea trade should a serious threat otherwise arise.[13] Highlighting the threat to shipping 
passing through the critical Straits of Hormuz as an example, Blair and Lieberthal also note that 
even at its height, the so-called Tanker War of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s affected only 
approximately 2 percent of oil tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf.[14]  
While a catastrophic stoppage of oil production and distribution may represent a worse case 
global scenario, in a global oil market that is today faced with slim excess production margins and 
increasing demand from China and other countries it may be the secondary market effects that 
are the most immediately destabilizing aftershock of attacks. Sea-based trade may remain 
critically vulnerable, and at risk, where the shore interfaces with the sea, such as oil loading 
terminals and associated infrastructure.[15] Recent attacks in Nigeria appear to confirm this 
assessment. In April 2008 the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
claimed credit for an attack on the oil pipeline that extends seaward to the Shell Bonny Island 
terminal and links it to mainland oil infrastructure.[16] While this attack only marginally impacted 
total world production, its immediate result was magnified due to tight, highly sensitive market 
conditions and contributed to a then record high oil price of over $117 per barrel.[17]  
The April 2008 MEND attack, and similar attacks since, provides a general confirmation of this 
study’s selection of the Shell Bonny Island terminal as a strategic geographic locus. However, 
since a cluster of complex attacks was also discovered in the vicinity of the major port of Lagos, 
Nigeria, the current study also provides evidence in support of the overall proposition that 
maritime risk may be potentially prominent at any point where strategic sea trade and land 
interdependencies exist. Alternatively, the general lack of complex, lethal attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca may indicate a lower overall threat environment.  
Overall, this study highlighted the multi-dimensionality of threats to maritime trade. On one hand, 
the Nigerian case underscored the criticality of sea to shore infrastructure and its potential 
vulnerability. On the other hand, the Straits of Malacca case generally supported the commonly 
held proposition that maritime chokepoints represent key vulnerabilities. However, instead of 
finding a single, determinant area of vulnerability, in each case multiple areas of risk were found 
to exist simultaneously. This finding may challenge counter-piracy strategists and policy makers 
to adopt prevention, intervention, and containment strategies that are regionally focused, multi-
faceted, and operationally integrated. The multi-dimensionality of threats to maritime trade may 
also highlight the important role that integrated analytic methodologies may play in identifying co-
existent threats and assisting in their prioritization for strategists and policy makers.  
Future research may extend this study’s risk framework by incorporating the political dimension of 
piracy attacks as an element of composite risk. There has been a concern that terror groups such 
as Al Qaeda may use piracy as practice for a sea-based version of the 9/11 attacks in which a 
ship may be commandeered and run aground in a critical port[18] or scuttled in a strategic 
narrow.[19] There has been speculation that some attacks involving the temporary seizure of 
ships may have already, in fact, been trial runs in piloting captured ships.[20] Further, attacks in 
Nigeria have an overt political dimension. In an attempt to exert pressure against the Nigerian 
government Nigerian rebels proclaimed an “oil war” that targets industry infrastructure.[21] 
Unfortunately, the International Maritime Bureau database used as the foundation for this study 
does not include the identification of all attack perpetrators. However, a future study that 
combined the IMB database with information gathered from open sources (e.g., media, print, etc.) 
could capture both the physical and political dimensions of attacks and usefully extend this 
study’s exploratory framework. 
Conclusion  
Despite limitations of under-reporting of maritime attacks,[22] this exploratory study was able to 
develop and empirically examine an integrated maritime risk assessment methodology that could 
potentially serve counter-piracy strategists. Based on this study’s findings, the authors suggest 
that maritime risk assessment methodologies would benefit from a multi-stage approach involving 
the collection and display of the geographic dimension of attacks and the subsequent re-
assessment of geographic patterns in terms of additional risk dimensions, such as attack 
complexity and lethality, in order to identify critical risk loci to which counter-piracy strategies 
could be applied. Due to research constraints, the current study was unable to examine other 
potentially important risk dimensions such as political intent. However, given worldwide concerns 
over terrorism, a more complete risk framework might additionally assess the criminal, political, or 
ideological motivations behind maritime attacks.  
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Figure 1: Density model representing overall 
complexity of Nigerian pirate attacks.  
Figure 2: Density model representing risk 
associated with Nigerian pirate attacks.  
 
Figure 3: Density model representing 
complexity of attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca.  
Figure 4. Density model representing overall 
risk associated with attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca.  
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